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NOTE 
Breaking the Ban: Sports Gambling, Anti-
Commandeering, and Lots and Lots of 
Money 
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
George R. Brand* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While Las Vegas is now commonly considered the pinnacle of modern 
American gambling, this has not always been the case.1  In the late 1970s, At-
lantic City, New Jersey, set out to challenge Las Vegas’ standing as America’s 
top gambling destination.2  The first Atlantic City casino opened in 1978,3 and 
between 1978 and 1985 the city’s casinos generated an average annual revenue 
growth rate of 55 percent.4  By contrast, Las Vegas’ first seven years of legal-
ized gambling from 1970 to 1977 only saw an average annual growth rate of 
15.6 percent among its casinos.5  In 1985, Atlantic City’s total gambling reve-
nue was almost fifty percent greater than that of the Las Vegas strip’s.6  How-
ever, modern-day Atlantic City does not hold a candle to Las Vegas when it 
  
* B.A., St. Olaf College, 2014, J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 
2019, Crosby M.B.A. Candidate, University of Missouri Trulaske College of Business, 
2019, Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2018-2019.  I wish to thank my faculty 
advisor, Professor Randy Diamond, for his generous research assistance and support.  I 
am also grateful to the Missouri Law Review staff for their help and encouragement 
during the editorial process. 
 1. James Kilsby, et. al., State of the States 2018, AM. GAMBLING ASS’N 17 (2018), 
https://www.americangaming.org/sites/de-
fault/files/AGA%202018%20State%20of%20the%20States%20Report_FINAL.pdf 
[perma.cc/ZHD7-7J6M].  In 2017, the Las Vegas strip generated $6.4 billion in reve-
nue. Id. The next closest locale, Atlantic City, only generated $2.4 billion. Id. 
 2. Mark Dent, Why Atlantic City Never Became the Next Las Vegas, and Went 
Broke Instead, BILLYPENN (Jul. 31, 2015, 8:42 AM), https://billy-
penn.com/2015/07/31/why-atlantic-city-never-became-the-next-las-vegas-and-went-
broke-instead/ [perma.cc/Q8J6-GKVX].  
 3. A Brief History of the Casino Control Commission, N.J. CASINO CONTROL 
COMM., https://www.state.nj.us/casinos/about/history/ [perma.cc/NGY7-7CFB]. 
 4. Atlantic City Gaming Revenue, CTR. FOR GAMING RES. 1 (Jan. 2019), 
https://gaming.unlv.edu/reports/ac_hist.pdf [perma.cc/6H3L-ZW3F]. 
 5. Dent, supra note 2.  
 6. In 1985, the total casino revenue in Atlantic City was $2,138,651,000. Atlantic 
City Gaming Revenue, supra note 4, at 2.  For the same year, the total casino revenue 
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comes to gambling revenues.  In 2017, the Las Vegas strip brought in almost 
five times the gambling revenue of Atlantic City.7 
While there are myriad factors impacting historical trends in gambling 
revenues across America, this Note will focus specifically on the legal treat-
ment of sports gambling.  In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Am-
ateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”),8 which banned sports gambling na-
tionwide, with a few exceptions such as Las Vegas.9  Under PASPA, all states 
had a one-year grace period after the statute went into effect where they could 
legalize sports gambling within their state and escape PASPA’s pending ban.10  
Although New Jersey failed to take advantage of this loophole during the grace 
period, state legislators attempted to legalize sports gambling twenty years later 
when voters approved an amendment to the state constitution in 2012.11  After 
a three-year legal battle with the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(“NCAA”) and the National Football League, National Basketball Association, 
National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball (“the Leagues”), that 
progressed all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States, New Jersey 
ultimately lost its initial attempt to legalize sports gambling.12 
After the failed attempt to legalize sports betting via constitutional 
amendment, New Jersey tried a different route in 2014 when it repealed provi-
sions of state law that had previously prohibited sports gambling (“2014 
Act”).13  The opponents from the prior litigation again filed a federal suit chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the 2014 Act.14  After losing at the state and 
circuit level, New Jersey ultimately prevailed when, in 2018, the Supreme 
Court determined in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association that 
PASPA’s ban of sports gambling was unconstitutional because it violated the 
well-established anti-commandeering doctrine.15 
  
for the Las Vegas Strip was $1,459,145,000. Nevada Gambling Revenues, CTR. FOR 
GAMING RES. 3 (Feb. 2019), https://gaming.unlv.edu/reports/NV_1984_present.pdf 
[perma.cc/SLP8-SZGV]. 
 7. In 2017, the total casino revenue in Atlantic City was $2,659,014,000. Atlantic 
City Gaming Revenue, supra note 4, at 2.  For the same year, the total casino revenue 
for the Las Vegas Strip was $6,460,473,000. Nevada Gambling Revenues, supra note 
6, at 3. 
 8. 28 U.SC. §§ 3701–3704 (2012).    
 9. § 3702. 
 10. § 3704. 
 11. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2. 
 12. Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 573 U.S. 391 (2014), denying cert. 
to Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 13. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1472 (2018). 
 14. See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488 
(D.N.J. 2014). 
 15. This is the case at hand. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1461.  The only reason 
“Christie” became “Murphy” in the case title is because Phil Murphy replaced 
Chris Christie as governor of New Jersey on January 16, 2018. Dustin Racioppi, 
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This decision marked only the third time the Court had struck down a 
state law for violating the anti-commandeering doctrine.16  While we are still 
very much in the wake of the Murphy ruling, its constitutional implications for 
other clashes between state and federal law are yet to be determined.  Within a 
few months after the Murphy decision, four states joined New Jersey in passing 
legislation to fully legalize sports gambling, and many other states have since 
passed limited legalization of certain types of sports gambling.17  More than a 
dozen other states have legislation pending to legalize sports gambling in whole 
or in part.18  As revenues from legalized sports gambling continue to rise, stake-
holders are well entrenched in quibbles over dividing the earnings appropri-
ately.  The Murphy ruling will undoubtedly go down as a watershed moment 
in the narrative of American sports gambling, and its implications for federal-
ism, state power, and the Constitution loom just as large. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On October 16, 2014, the New Jersey Senate repealed portions of state 
law prohibiting betting on professional, collegiate, or amateur sporting events 
in Atlantic City or at horseracing tracks throughout the state.19  The 2014 Act 
only repealed gambling restrictions for people twenty-one or older and quali-
fied that the sports activity to which the act applied “shall not include a colle-
giate sport contest or collegiate athletic event that takes place in New Jersey or 
. . . in which any New Jersey college team participates regardless of where the 
event takes place.”  Casinos and individuals in Atlantic City or at horseracing 
tracks in New Jersey were allowed to facilitate and participate in sports betting 
as long as the betting event took place outside of New Jersey and did not in-
volve the participation of a New Jersey collegiate team.20 
  
Phil Murphy Becomes Governor of New Jersey, Plans New Direction for State, 
NORTHJERSEY.COM (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.northjer-
sey.com/story/news/new-jersey/governor/2018/01/16/phil-murphy-becomes-
plans-new-direction-new-jersey/1026568001/ [perma.cc/D2SB-33BL].  
 16. For the previous two instances where the Court took action under the anti-
commandeering doctrine, see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), and 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
 17. After Murphy legalized sports gambling in New Jersey, the following states 
have followed suit with full-scale legalization: Delaware, Mississippi, West Virginia, 
New Mexico, and Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. See Ryan Rodenberg, United States 
of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where Every State Stands, ESPN (May 25, 
2019), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/the-united-states-sports-bet-
ting-where-all-50-states-stand-legalization [perma.cc/C46W-PTQ7]. 
 18. Id.   
 19. Matt Friedman, N.J. Sports Betting Bill Headed to Christie’s Desk, NJ.COM 
(Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.nj.com/politics/2014/10/nj_sports_bet-
ting_bill_headed_to_christies_desk.html#incart_river [perma.cc/36XJ-K6MP]. 
 20. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1472 (2018). 
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This 2014 Act is the impetus behind the instant case.  In response to the 
2014 Act, the NCAA and the Leagues collectively filed suit against New Jersey 
governor Chris Christie in federal court, seeking to invalidate the 2014 Act.21  
During the four years between the initial lawsuit and the issuance of the opinion 
at hand, Phil Murphy replaced Chris Christie as the governor of New Jersey.22  
Although the party’s name changed over time, the instant case is an appeal 
from the original 2014 suit filed against then-governor Chris Christie in his 
elected capacity.23 
The Leagues alleged the 2014 Act conflicted with PASPA which, for over 
twenty years, had outlawed sports betting almost everywhere in America ex-
cept for a few specialized locations.24  The relevant portion of PASPA made it 
unlawful for state governments to “authorize . . . betting, gambling, or wager-
ing scheme[s] based . . . on one or more competitive games in which amateur 
or professional athletes participate.”25  The Leagues focused on the word “au-
thorize” as it appeared in PASPA.26  Citing Black’s Law Dictionary, they al-
leged the word “permit” should fall under the umbrella of the word “authorize” 
as used in PASPA.27  The logical flow, according to the Leagues, was that the 
2014 Act violated PASPA because it “permitted” sports gambling to take place 
in New Jersey.28 
New Jersey countered and urged the Court to read an affirmative act re-
quirement into the word “authorize” as used in PASPA.29  Because the 2014 
Act repealed a state statute, New Jersey argued it lacked the affirmative act 
required to violate PASPA’s ban.  Also, referencing Black’s Law Dictionary, 
New Jersey asked the court to define “authorize” as “to empower; to give a 
right or authority to act; to endow with authority.”30  Lastly, it asked the Court 
to interpret the 2014 Act as a piece of legislation that “empowers a defined 
  
 21. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 490–91 (D.N.J. 
2014). 
 22. Dustin Racioppi, Phil Murphy Becomes Governor of New Jersey, Plans New 
Direction for State, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.northjer-
sey.com/story/news/new-jersey/governor/2018/01/16/phil-murphy-becomes-plans-
new-direction-new-jersey/1026568001/ [perma.cc/2R8R-26P9]. 
 23. See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie 61 F. Supp. 3d 488 
(D. N.J. 2014). 
 24. Id. at 495.  
 25. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012). 
 26. Brief for Petitioner at 31, Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1461 (2018) (No. 16-476), 2017 WL 3774488, at *31.   
 27. Id. at 31–32.  
 28. Id. at 32. 
 29. Brief for Respondent at 2, Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1461 (2018) (No. 16-476), 2017 WL 4684747, at *2. 
 30. Id. at 39 
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group of entities, and . . . endows them with the authority to conduct sports 
gambling operations.”31   
In addition to disagreeing over the interpretation of the word “authorize,” 
the litigants disagreed over the extent to which PASPA and the 2014 Act con-
flicted with the anti-commandeering doctrine.32  New Jersey argued that the 
2014 Act should be upheld “in order to avoid any anti-commandeering problem 
that would arise if [PASPA] were construed to require States to maintain their 
laws prohibiting sports gambling.”  Conversely, the Leagues saw no anti-com-
mandeering problems arising from PASPA’s restrictions against sports gam-
bling legalization.33 
The Court distilled the anti-commandeering doctrine as “the decision to 
withhold from Congress the power to issue orders directly to the States.”34  Un-
der the dual sovereignty system, both the federal government and individual 
state governments hold separate powers over specified legal jurisdictions.35  
The anti-commandeering doctrine typifies this central tenet of dual-sover-
eignty: neither the federal government nor an individual state government can 
attempt to commandeer the other by enacting or enforcing legislation that en-
croaches beyond each entity’s designated realm of control.36  Effectively, the 
doctrine prevents either a state or federal government from explicitly com-
manding the other to act in a specific way.37  
The trial court agreed with the petitioners and invalidated the 2014 Act 
because it was preempted by PASPA.38  Governor Christie, who held office 
until January 2018, appealed the trial court’s ruling, and a panel of judges for 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s deci-
sion in a two to one vote.39  Judge Julio M. Fuentes wrote a dissenting opinion 
in which he argued the 2014 Act’s partial repeal of laws banning sports betting 
in New Jersey did not amount to an “authorization by law” sufficient enough 
to run afoul of PASPA’s comprehensive ban.40 
The panel ruling was later vacated upon approval of New Jersey’s petition 
for a rehearing en banc.41  Upon rehearing, the Third Circuit, en banc, also 
  
 31. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn., 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1473 (2018). 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 1475 (internal citations omitted).  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)). 
 36. Id. at 1475–76.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 504 (D.N.J. 
2014). 
 39. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 799 F.3d 259, 268 (3d Cir. 
2015). 
 40. Id. at 270 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
 41. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
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affirmed the trial court with a nine to three vote and held “the 2014 Law vio-
lates PASPA because it authorized by law sports gambling.”42  The Third Cir-
cuit further held that PASPA did not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine 
because the law “includes no coercive direction by the federal government” 
that would command or require states to take any affirmative steps.43  Yet 
again, Judge Fuentes wrote a dissenting opinion, this time joined by Judge Fe-
lipe Restrepo, which refuted the assertion that the 2014 Act met the “authoriz-
ing by law” requirement of PASPA.44  In essence, the dissent argued that re-
pealing a prior law was not tantamount to a wholehearted “authorization” of 
sports betting in New Jersey.  Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie wrote a second dis-
senting opinion in which he argued PASPA’s core provision that states “main-
tain an anti-sports wagering scheme” was, in and of itself, a violation of the 
anti-commandeering doctrine.45 
The Court granted certiorari and, in a six to three decision, ruled in favor 
of New Jersey and adopted Judge Vanaskie’s dissent.46  Although the Court 
agreed with the petitioners’ interpretation that the repeal instituted by the 2014 
Act constituted an “authorization” of sports betting as articulated in PASPA, it 
held the entire spirit of PASPA violated the anti-commandeering doctrine.47  
The Court applied its test for severability to determine which parts, if any, of 
PASPA it could retain in order to remove any portion of the act that violated 
the anti-commandeering doctrine.  But, because the Court failed to find any 
severable components of PASPA, it invalidated the statute entirely.48  Justice 
Thomas wrote a concurrence in which he expressed his “growing discomfort 
with our modern severability precedents” that require judges to attempt to in-
terpret legislative intent.49  Additionally, Justices Ginsburg authored a dissent, 
joined by Justice Sotomayor and joined in part by Justice Breyer, in which she 
argued that part of PASPA was severable and that the statute could have been 
revised and retained without running afoul of the anti-commandeering doc-
trine.50 
In its entirety, the Court’s holding declared that when a federal statute 
issues a command regulating the conduct of a state government, the statute vi-
olates the anti-commandeering principle and, in accordance with standard sev-
erability procedure, all statutory components in violation of this doctrine 
should be invalidated.51 
  
 42. Id. at 396. 
 43. Id. at 402.  
 44. Id. at 403 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. at 406–07 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting). 
 46. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn., 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1468 (2018). 
 47. Id. at 1481.  
 48. Id. at 1484.  
 49. Id. at 1485 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 50. Id. at 1490 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 51. Id. at 1481–84. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The legislative and litigation history leading up to Murphy is quite com-
plex.  Exploring the groundswell that led to PASPA’s initial ban against sports 
betting helps explain the strong opposition to New Jersey’s attempt to repeal 
the ban.  Furthermore, a timeline and summary of the extended legal battle 
behind the 2014 Act further fleshes out the decision ultimately reached by the 
Court. 
A. Sports Gambling Legislation Timeline 
States started passing legislation banning gambling in the nineteenth cen-
tury, and by 1900, gambling of all kinds was largely banned throughout the 
country.52  New Jersey adopted a constitutional amendment in 1897 that 
banned all gambling within the state.53  However, starting in the 1920s and 
1930s, states across the country began to gradually loosen gambling re-
strictions.54  New Jersey started allowing betting on horse races during the De-
pression era, began allowing churches and nonprofits to host bingo games in 
the 1950s, and instituted a state-run lottery in 1970.55 
However, as it gradually loosened its ban on gambling, New Jersey, like 
every other state besides Nevada, still did not allow casinos to operate as legal 
gambling institutions.  Although a 1974 statewide referendum to legalize ca-
sino gambling across New Jersey failed,56 just two years later, New Jersey vot-
ers approved a stricter referendum that allowed casino gambling only in Atlan-
tic City.57  Consequently, in 1976, Atlantic City joined Las Vegas as one of the 
only locations in America with legal casinos.  Yet, even in Atlantic City’s ca-
sinos, sports gambling was still banned because of fears surrounding its addic-
  
 52. See generally Virgil W. Peterson, History of Legalized Gambling in the United 
States, in GAMBLING: SHOULD IT BE LEGALIZED 46–75 (1951). 
 53. See Atl. City Racing Ass’n v. Att’y Gen., 489 A.2d 165, 167–68 (N.J. 1985). 
 54. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1468–69. 
 55. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:9–1 (West 2019); Jay M. Gutierrez, The Casino Act: Gam-
bling’s Past and the Casino Act’s Future, 10 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 279, 287-88 
(1979); N.J. CONST., art. 4, § 7, ¶ 2. 
 56. Gutierrez, supra note 55, at 289. 
 57. Id.; N.J. CONST., art. 4 § 7, ¶ 2. 
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tive nature for gamblers and its possibility of influencing the behavior of ath-
letes.58  In addition to professional sports leagues, the NCAA especially op-
posed legalizing sports gambling because of the potential for corruption and 
bribery among its amateur athletes.59 
To quash the momentum surrounding sports gambling in the late twenti-
eth century, New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley, a former collegiate and profes-
sional basketball player, pushed PASPA through Congress in 1992.60  PASPA 
made it unlawful for a person, state, or other governmental entity “to sponsor, 
operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or 
other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based . . . on competitive sporting 
events.”61  PASPA did not criminalize sports gambling; rather, it gave the at-
torney general and the Leagues themselves the ability to bring civil actions 
against people or organizations that violated the ban against sports gambling.62 
When Congress enacted PASPA in 1992, it included a grandfather provi-
sion allowing the few jurisdictions that had previously legalized sports gam-
bling, like Nevada, to continue their operations.63  PASPA also allowed a one-
year grace period for states to legalize sports gambling on their own before the 
ban became permanent.64  New Jersey did not take advantage of this one-year 
provision then, but later passed legislation that legalized sports gambling in 
2012 – a full twenty years after PASPA took effect.65 
  
 58. Murphy, 138 U.S. at 1469–70; see also Sean Crawford, You Think You Know 
the Story of the 1919 Black Sox? Think Again, NPR ILL. (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://www.nprillinois.org/post/you-know-story-1919-black-sox-think-
again#stream/0 [perma.cc/B7E2-PR7T]; Albert J. Figone, Gambling and College Bas-
ketball: The Scandal of 1951, 16 J. OF SPORT HIST. 44 (1989) (detailing the convictions 
of several college basketball players in the 1950s for accepting bribes to shave points 
during games). 
 59. Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 
21, 39, 46–47, 59–60, 227 (1991) (statements by representatives of major sports leagues 
opposing sports gambling).   
 60. Dave Zirin, “Athletes Aren’t Roulette Chips:” Bill Bradley Speaks Out on 
Gambling in Sports, THE NATION (June 12, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/arti-
cle/athletes-arent-roulette-chips-bill-bradley-speaks-gambling-sports/ 
[perma.cc/NB6Y-8TSN]. 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012).  
 62. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1465 
 63. § 3704(a). 
 64. Id.  
 65. Matt Friedman, Gov. Christie Signs Bill Allowing Gamblers to Place Bets on 
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B.  Christie I 
After voters approved a 2011 state constitutional amendment that made it 
lawful for the state legislature to authorize sports gambling,66 the New Jersey 
legislature enacted a law in 2012 that legalized sports gambling in the state 
(“2012 Act”).67  In response to the 2012 Act, the NCAA and the Leagues filed 
a federal suit against New Jersey governor Chris Christie and two other state 
gaming executives in the District Court of New Jersey.68  The plaintiffs sought 
to enforce PASPA’s ban against states’ authorization of sports betting, whereas 
the defendants argued PASPA violated the Commerce Clause, the Tenth 
Amendment, the due process clause, equal protection principles, the anti-com-
mandeering doctrine, and the equal footing doctrine.69  While the court 
acknowledged that some of the defendant’s qualms with PASPA were “novel,” 
it ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and held that “to the extent the people of New 
Jersey disagree with PASPA, their remedy is not through the passage of a state 
law or through the judiciary, but through the repeal or amendment of PASPA 
in Congress.”70 
Upon New Jersey’s appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
judgment in favor of the Leagues.71  The Third Circuit acknowledged the nu-
ances posed by the anti-commandeering doctrine violations asserted by New 
Jersey but declined to rule in favor of the 2012 Law because “doing so would 
result in an undue expansion of the anti-commandeering doctrine.”72  Judge 
Vanaskie wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued PASPA violated the 
anti-commandeering doctrine because it “regulate[s] state governments’ regu-
lation” of sports gambling protocol within New Jersey.73 
After losing at the circuit level, New Jersey petitioned the Supreme Court 
for a writ of certiorari to rule on the anti-commandeering doctrine issues 
acknowledged by the Third Circuit, but the Court denied review.74  However, 
the United States intervened and wrote a brief opposing certiorari in which it 
argued, “PASPA does not even obligate New Jersey to leave in place the state-
law prohibitions against sports gambling that it had chosen to adopt prior to 
  
 66. N.J. CONST., art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2. 
 67. Friedman, supra note 65. 
 68. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553 (D.N.J. 
2013). 
 69. Id. at 554. 
 70. Id. at 555.  
 71. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 240–41 (3d 
Cir. 2013). 
 72. Id. at 237.  
 73. Id. at 251 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 166 (1992)). 
 74. Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 573 U.S. 931 (2014). 
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PASPA’s enactment.  To the contrary, New Jersey is free to repeal those pro-
hibitions in whole or in part.”75 
In response to the advice given by the United States’ brief, the New Jersey 
Legislature enacted the 2014 Act. Unlike the 2012 Law, which affirmatively 
legalized gambling, the 2014 Act repealed prior provisions of New Jersey state 
law that prohibited sports gambling within the state.76  The 2014 Act specifi-
cally stated it was not intended to violate PASPA – it simply repealed New 
Jersey’s own ban against gambling on sporting events not involving a New 
Jersey collegiate team or a collegiate sporting event taking place in New Jer-
sey.77  The 2014 Act further specified it only repealed sports gambling bans for 
people twenty-one or over who attempted to gamble at horseracing tracks or 
casinos in Atlantic City.78  While the 2012 Law affirmatively legalized sports 
gambling in New Jersey, the 2014 Act effectively allowed sports gambling by 
removing the prior restrictions.79  Although the end is basically the same, the 
sticky legal issues surrounding this case presented plenty of opportunities to 
distinguish New Jersey’s 2014 attempt to legalize sports gambling from the 
failed 2012 attempt.  The lawsuit over the 2014 attempt eventually reached the 
Court in 2018. 
C.  Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
New Jersey’s main argument for upholding the 2014 Act was that 
PASPA’s command against states’ authorization of sports gambling violated 
the anti-commandeering doctrine.80  Although this doctrine stems from the 
Constitution, it has been developed and elucidated by common law.81  While 
the Constitution enumerates certain powers that Congress has over the states, 
the Tenth Amendment reserves all legislative power not enumerated in the 
Constitution for the states.82  Absent from the enumerated Constitutional pow-
ers is the ability for Congress to issue direct orders to state governments.  This 
  
 75. Brief for United States in Opposition at 11, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass’n, 573 U.S. 931 (2014) (No. 13-967), 2014 WL 1989100, at *11; see also 
Brief in Opposition at 23 Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 573 U.S. 931 
(2014) (No. 13-967), 2014 WL 1989124, at *23 (stating, “Nothing in that unambiguous 
language compels states to prohibit or maintain any existing prohibition on sports gam-
bling.”). 
 76. S.B. 2460, 216 Leg. (N.J. 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Act].  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 81. Id. at 227–32. 
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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absence undergirds the anti-commandeering doctrine.83  Prior to Murphy, the 
Court had only twice utilized the anti-commandeering doctrine to strike down 
federal statutes.84 
The 1992 case, New York v. United States, involved the Low-Level Radi-
oactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.85  In an effort to combat the 
growing problem of collecting and disposing of radioactive waste, the Act 
forced specified states to either take title to radioactive waste or regulate the 
treatment of the waste in accordance with Congressional instruction.86  After 
much explanation of the Tenth Amendment and the federalist division of state 
and national power as designed by the drafters of the Constitution, the Court 
invalidated the federal law because it compelled the states to enact or adminis-
ter the federal regulatory program.87  The Court clarified that the key issue was 
that the Act “enable[d] Congress to command a state government to enact state 
regulation.”88  The Court did not dispute Congress’ ability to regulate radioac-
tive waste removal, but, because the regulation subjected states to the regula-
tory whims of a federal principal, the Act was deemed unconstitutional.89 
Five years later, in Printz v. United States, the Court again invalidated a 
federal law that violated the anti-commandeering doctrine.90  The law at issue 
in Printz was the 1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act which “com-
mand[ed] state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background 
checks on prospective handgun purchasers and to perform certain related tasks” 
when transferring ownership of handguns from dealers to buyers.91  The Court 
held the law in Printz violated the anti-commandeering doctrine because it 
“command[ed] the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal regu-
latory program.”92  The Court in Printz wrote that the anti-commandeering doc-
trine was important because it served as “one of the Constitution’s structural 
protections of liberty,” that states’ regulatory authority cannot be subject to 
  
 83. Id.; see also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000) (quoting New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (“While Congress has substantial powers to 
govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the 
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require 
the states to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”)). 
 84. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 215. 
 85. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). 
 86. Id. at 151–54. 
 87. Id. at 188.  
 88. Id. at 178.  
 89. Id. (“Where a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legis-
late, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents.”). 
 90. 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). 
 91. Id. at 902–03. 
 92. Id. at 935.  
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federal control.93  In Printz, the Court decided that if Congress wanted to reg-
ulate handgun registration procedures, it could not do so by compelling state 
governments to enforce federal policy.94 
D.  Severability Procedure 
When a court determines that all or part of a federal statute is unconstitu-
tional, it must go through a severability process to determine whether to inval-
idate the statute in its entirety or remove only specific components of the statute 
and leave the remaining statutory authority intact.95  Over the years, the Court 
has created a series of steps and considerations to guide lower courts through 
the severability process. 
In Regan v. Time, Inc., the Court considered the constitutionality of a stat-
ute that barred magazines from reprinting images of United States currency.96  
Although the Court determined the statute was unconstitutional because it 
abridged free press rights afforded to magazines by the First Amendment, the 
Court still had to determine how to handle the statute at issue.97  The Regan 
Court decided that when reviewing statutes with unconstitutional components, 
the Court should “refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is neces-
sary” to effect legal compliance within the statute.98  In Regan, the Court re-
vised the statute to keep its legislative intent intact but removed the unconsti-
tutional components.99  In fact, courts are required to  retain portions of a statute 
that are constitutionally valid,100 capable of functioning independently,101 and 
consistent with Congress’ original intent.102  This third parameter sometimes 
presents a challenging task that Justice Thomas has criticized for asking courts 
to make “a nebulous inquiry into hypothetical congressional intent.”103 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
Ultimately, the Court in Murphy struck down all of PASPA because it 
violated the anti-commandeering doctrine, finding no part of the statute was 
severable.104  Because PASPA prevented states from sponsoring, operating, 
  
 93. Id. at 921.  
 94. Id. at 935.  
 95. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186–87 (1992). 
 96. 468 U.S. 641, 647–48 (1984). 
 97. Id. at 641–42. 
 98. Id. at 652.  
 99. Id. at 652–59. 
 100. Id. at 652–53. 
 101. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987). 
 102. Regan, 468 U.S. at 653. 
 103. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 320 n. 7 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
in part). 
 104. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1461, 1484 (2018). 
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advertising, promoting, licensing, or authorizing sports gambling, the Court 
determined that “state legislatures [were] put under the direct control of Con-
gress[ional]” instruction, which violated the anti-commandeering doctrine.105 
The United States attempted to distinguish PASPA from previous anti-
commandeering cases by highlighting the statute’s converse nature.  While the 
statutes at issue in New York and Printz were affirmative commands from Con-
gress that states must assist in regulatory efforts, PASPA was a Congressional 
command that states refrain from legalizing sports gambling.106  However, the 
Court determined “this distinction [was] empty.  It was a matter of happen-
stance that the laws challenged in New York and Printz commanded ‘affirma-
tive’ action as opposed to imposing a prohibition.  The basic principle – that 
Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures – applies in either 
event.”107 
The Court did not sever any component of PASPA that could remain law-
ful; it invalidated PASPA entirely.108  The Court considered each distinct ac-
tivity that PASPA forbade regarding sports gambling – sponsoring, operating, 
advertising, promoting, licensing, or authorizing – and determined that each of 
these commands equally violated the anti-commandeering doctrine.109  In ag-
gregation of each violation, the Court declared the entire statute unconstitu-
tional.110 
Justice Thomas agreed with the decision to invalidate all of PASPA but 
wrote a separate concurrence in which he “expressed growing discomfort” with 
the Court’s severability procedure.111  Thomas’ concurrence contains two main 
critiques of the procedure.  First, he argued the severability procedure “does 
not follow basic principles of statutory interpretation” because it requires 
courts to make subjective guesses at legislative intent.112  “Without any actual 
evidence of [congressional] intent,” Thomas argued, “the severability doctrine 
invites courts to rely on their own views about what the best statute would 
be.”113  Thomas claimed this guessing game invites judges to impart their own 
subjective desires rather than adhere to traditional judicial norms of objective 
statutory interpretation.114  
Second, Justice Thomas fears that modern severability procedure often 
violates traditional norms of legal standing.115  Because modern severability 
procedure asks courts to evaluate an entire statute when the case at hand may 
  
 105. Id. at 1478. 
 106. Id. at 1481–82.  
 107. Id. at 1478.  
 108. Id. at 1484.  
 109. Id. at 1481–84. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 1484 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 112. Id. at 1486.  
 113. Id. at 1487.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
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only confront subsections, Justice Thomas cautioned that the procedure 
“bring[s] courts dangerously close to issuing advisory opinions.”116  Justice 
Thomas called the severability doctrine “an unexplained exception to the nor-
mal rules of standing” because it allows courts to evaluate an entire statute 
when the case before it may only interact with specific statutory components.117 
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor 
and joined in part by Justice Breyer, which also critiqued the severability pro-
cedure as displayed by the majority opinion.118  The dissent took issue with the 
decision to invalidate all of PASPA and allow states to legalize sports gambling 
because this was clearly contrary to PASPA’s original intent.119  The dissenting 
justices did not dispute that Congress maintained the power to regulate sports 
gambling nationwide.120  Neither did they dispute that some of the methods 
used in PASPA violated the anti-commandeering doctrine.121  However, the 
dissenters asked to strike only the PASPA provisions against “authorizing” and 
“licensing” sports gambling schemes because they argued only those actions 
indicated direct commands to states.122  With this narrowed revision, PASPA 
would still ban states and private parties from “sponsoring, operating, adver-
tising, or promoting” sports gambling, which, the dissent argued, would not 
violate anti-commandeering principles.123  The dissent’s main critique was that 
“the Court wield[ed] an ax to cut down [PASPA] instead of using a scalpel to 
trim the statute.”124 
V.  COMMENT 
As we are still in a nascent state of widespread legalization of sports gam-
bling, many of the repercussions from Murphy have not yet been realized.  
However, the ruling will undoubtedly yield development in two massive 
spheres of impact.  From a legal standpoint, the expansion of the anti-comman-
deering doctrine and challenges to severability procedure could prompt legis-
lative changes or further statutory challenges.  From an economic standpoint, 
repealing the federal ban against sports gambling opens the floodgates to mas-
sive amounts of new revenue streams.  There are plenty of stakeholders in this 
post-PASPA society, and various factions throughout the country will scruti-
nize, condemn, applaud, or attempt to expand the Court’s decision in Murphy.  
  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 1488 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 119. Id. at 1490.  
 120. Id. at 1489.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 1490.  
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A.  Legal Significance 
Murphy represents only the third time the Court has utilized the anti-com-
mandeering doctrine to invalidate a federal law.125  This decision will have a 
tremendous impact on future confrontations between state and federal law be-
cause it adds teeth to looming threats posed by the anti-commandeering doc-
trine.126  However, as the concurring and dissenting opinion articulate, the real 
lasting legal significance of the majority opinion in Murphy may likely be its 
implications on severability procedure.  Hopefully, this case will prompt a 
long-overdue revision of the Court’s antiquated and unusual severability pro-
cess that calls into question traditional judicial norms of standing and objective 
statutory interpretation and application. 
As Justice Thomas’ concurrence argued, standard severability procedure 
allows the Court to evaluate an entire statute when a case at hand may challenge 
only specific statutory sections.127  This step in the severability process is a 
product of federal common law.128  Perhaps the theory is one of providence: if 
the Court must edit and revise one section of a statute, it might as well examine 
the whole law to preempt future challenges.  While this practice raises ques-
tions as to a court’s standing, federal common law has created a version of 
supplemental standing when it comes to severability procedures.129  Under this 
regime, even when faced with a limited attack on a distinct segment of a statute, 
the Court reviews the entire statute as a whole.  
While the modified standing position affiliated with severability proce-
dure is a logical solution to the problems at hand, the critiques espoused by 
Justice Thomas’ concurrence and Justices Ginsburg’s dissent also warrant 
careful consideration.  If the Court is going to have such broad editorial power, 
it needs to be more prudent.  In this instance, when the Court reviews entire 
  
 125. Id. at 1471; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 126. For example, interested parties have already wondered how Murphy’s ruling 
could be applied to other pending federalism issues such as the ongoing disagreement 
over sanctuary cities amidst Congressional immigration policies and gun control reform 
initiatives. See, Ilya Somin, Federalism Comes Out as the Winner in Murphy v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, THE REGULATORY REV. (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/07/10/somin-federalism-comes-out-winner-mur-
phy-v-ncaa/ [perma.cc/Q668-5RW5]; see also, Cory D. Lapin, The Potentially Far-
Reaching Implications of Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Outside of Sports 
Betting, DEFENSE LITIG. INSIDER (May 30, 2018), https://www.defenselitigationin-
sider.com/2018/05/30/the-potentially-far-reaching-implications-of-murphy-v-ncaa-
outside-of-sports-betting/ [perma.cc/Z5SY-J89X]. 
 127. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1486 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 128. See, e.g., Erik R. Zimmerman, Supplemental Standing for Severability, 109 
NW. U. L.  REV. 285 (2015). 
 129. Id.  Note the confusion and tension highlighted in the article between supple-
mental standing as implicitly displayed by common law and as explicitly explained by 
the Court itself. 
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statutes even though litigants only challenge specific parts, an optimal editorial 
process requires the Court to revise the statute while keeping congressional 
intent in mind.  PASPA’s obvious intent was to implement a nationwide ban 
on sports gambling.  However, as the majority in Murphy articulated, the ban 
imposed by PASPA violated the anti-commandeering doctrine because it com-
manded states to regulate sports gambling rather than institute the ban at the 
federal level.130  Congress did not lack the ability to ban sports gambling; it 
simply violated the Constitution in its attempt to do so with PASPA.131  Surely, 
as the dissent argues, the Court in Murphy could have revised PASPA while 
still “accomplish[ing] just what Congress legitimately sought to achieve: stop-
ping sports-gambling regimes while making it clear that the stoppage is at-
tributable to federal, not state, action.”132  If we retain the supplemental stand-
ing regime that has been read into the severability process, the Court needs to 
do a better job of aligning its statutory revision with obvious legislative intent. 
A cornerstone rule in severability procedure is that the Court “cannot re-
write a statute and give it an effect altogether different from that sought by the 
measure viewed as a whole.”133  As the dissent in Murphy argues, the end result 
of the Court’s severability process is sometimes obviously at odds with legis-
lative intent.134  To avoid this potential problem, Congress could play a more 
active role in the severability process in order to assure legislative intent is 
properly followed.135  Such a regime was explored in Mr. Robert L. Nightin-
gale’s article, “How to Trim a Christmas Tree: Beyond Severability and Inse-
verability for Omnibus Statutes.”136  Mr. Nightingale explored the possibility 
of a collaborative effort between the Court and Congress to redraft unconstitu-
tional statutes, rather than dismantle them completely. 
Mr. Nightingale’s scenario essentially adds a grace period under which 
Congress can redraft statutes the Court has declared unconstitutional.137  As 
long as legislators produce a new statute before the end of the grace period, the 
old statute gets amended rather than dismantled and replaced.138  While Mr. 
Nightingale’s hypothetical situation might better achieve the demonstrated 
goal of severability reform – that bad statutes get rewritten rather than rejected 
– enacting such a regime where the federal judicial and legislative branches 
work so closely together invites a dangerous slippery slope argument about the 
  
 130. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484–85.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 1490 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 133. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co. 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935). 
 134. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1490 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Robert L. Nightingale, How to Trim a Christmas Tree: Beyond Severability 
and Inseverability for Omnibus Statutes, 125 YALE L.J. 1672 (2016) (exploring the pos-
sibility of a collaborative effort between the Court and Congress to redraft unconstitu-
tional statutes rather than dismantle them completely).  
 137. Id. at 1680.  
 138. Id. at 1725–26. 
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division of powers doctrine that would likely cause many Founding Fathers to 
turn over in their graves.  The Court does not issue advisory opinions on stat-
utes still in the drafting process; it only hears cases regarding statutes already 
enacted by Congress.139  
Whether Congress and the Court will collaborate on severability issues 
remains to be seen, but the current process of severability procedure asks the 
Court to contradict traditional notions of separation of powers and judicial in-
dependence.  Courts should apply laws – not revise them.  The Court needs to 
redefine severability procedure so that judges do not have to make “a nebulous 
inquiry into hypothetical congressional intent” when they attempt to refine un-
constitutional statutes.140  Justice Thomas’ concurrence aptly focuses on a sig-
nificant legal ramification of Murphy that demands further revision.141 
B.  Economic Significance 
The economic implications of expanded legalization of sports gambling 
are nothing short of enormous.  In 2017, the last year before sports gambling 
became legalized in any other state, Nevada set a new record with $248.8 mil-
lion in sports gambling revenue.142  Since the Murphy ruling came down in 
May 2018, New Mexico, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Delaware joined Ne-
vada and New Jersey in passing legislation that legalized sports gambling at 
casinos and racetracks within the state.143  Three other states are in the process 
of passing bills that will legalize sports gambling, and fifteen more have al-
ready introduced bills attempting to do so.144  Unless something abruptly 
changes, widespread legalization of sports gambling appears imminent. 
New Jersey generated $3.5 million in sports gambling revenue in just the 
first seventeen days after legalization.145  New Jersey sports gambling revenues 
have also started to skyrocket since the NFL, NBA, and NHL seasons began in 
the fall of 2018.146  The month of August saw just over $6 million in revenue 
  
 139. See e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 354–55 (1911).  
 140. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 320 (2005). (Thomas, J., dissenting in 
part). 
 141. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1485–87.   
 142. Dustin Gouker, Nevada Sportsbooks Set Record with a Quarter of a Billion 
Dollars of Revenue in 2017, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 31, 2018, 9:44 AM), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/18130/nevada-sportsbooks-2017/ [perma.cc/3PY7-
XSBR]. 
 143. Rodenberg, supra note 17. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Eric Ramsey, The First Month of New Jersey Sports Betting: $16 Million in 
Wagers, $3.5 Million in Revenue, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (July 12, 2018, 12:49 PM), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/21931/new-jersey-sports-betting-revenue-june-
2018/ [perma.cc/KBF6-AY5M]. 
 146. New Jersey Sports Betting Revenues, PLAY NJ (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.playnj.com/sports-betting/revenue/ [perma.cc/LX9P-D7MU]. 
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generation, and that number almost doubled to $11.5 million in September.147  
As of October 2018, New Jersey sports gambling generated over $40 million 
in revenue in just the first five months after Murphy.148  Based on factors such 
as high concentrations of wealth, close proximity to New York City, and the 
growth of online gambling platforms, some wonder if New Jersey will soon 
eclipse Nevada’s stranglehold as the leading gambling market nationwide.149  
However, New Jersey has a long way to go – Nevada sports books hauled in a 
new single-month record of $56.3 million in sports gambling revenues in Sep-
tember, almost five times New Jersey’s reported figure.150  
The Court’s ruling in Murphy catalyzed a jolt in sports gambling nation-
wide.  What was previously an illegal activity outside Nevada is now regulated 
and taxed like any other industry.  Although others have much higher expecta-
tions, New Jersey Treasurer Elizabeth Muoio expects sports gambling to gen-
erate $13 million in state tax revenue in the first year based on an eight to 
twelve percent tax rate on casinos.151  By comparison, Nevada drew $17 mil-
lion in state tax revenue in 2017 with a 6.75% tax rate on casinos.152  Most 
states have between 7–15% tax rates on casinos, but some, like Pennsylvania, 
plan to tax sports gambling at rates as high as 36%.153 
While state governments are excited about the potential tax revenues as-
sociated with legalized sports gambling, other stakeholders are afraid of miss-
ing the party.  The NCAA and the Leagues are clamoring to reach deals with 
states and casinos to guarantee a fair share of the profits generated by their 
  
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Roger Aitken, U.S. Sports Betting Market: Could New jersey Eclipse Nevada 
to Become No.1?, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2018, 2:49pm), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rog-
eraitken/2018/08/12/u-s-sports-betting-market-could-new-jersey-eclipse-nevada-to-
become-no-1/#4801238527ca [perma.cc/PA3K-83KN]; Howard Stutz, Prediction: 
New Jersey Sports Betting Revenues to Exceed Nevada by 2021, CDC GAMING REP. 
(Sept. 10, 2018, 12:21 AM), https://www.cdcgamingreports.com/prediction-new-jer-
sey-sports-betting-revenues-to-exceed-nevada-by-2021/ [perma.cc/HR2Y-SAEL]; Sa-
mantha Marcus, N.J. Sports Betting Could Overtake Nevada by 2021, NJ.COM (Sept. 5, 
2018), https://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2018/09/nj_sports_betting_could_over-
take_nevada_by_2021.html [perma.cc/T4P5-3CCH]. 
 150. David Purdum, Nevada Sportsbooks Have Record September, ESPN (Oct. 30, 
2018, 11:12 AM) http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/25126270/nevada-sports-
books-record-september [perma.cc/7PC3-29V3]. 
 151. Brent Johnson, This Is How Much Money Sports Betting is Expected to Bring 
N.J., NJ.COM (May 21, 2018), https://www.nj.com/politics/in-
dex.ssf/2018/05/this_is_how_much_money_sports_betting_is_expected.html 
[perma.cc/5TX9-GG5D]. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Eric Ramsey, Let’s Talk About PA’s Insanely High Sports Betting Tax, PLAY 
PENN. (May 25, 2018), https://www.playpennsylvania.com/pa-sports-betting-tax-high/ 
[perma.cc/27DT-ZEBT]. 
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teams.154  However, states are already pushing back against calls to share pro-
ceeds from legalized sports gambling.155  For example, New Jersey State Sen-
ator Steve Sweeney spoke out against the idea of states forming profit sharing 
arrangements with sports leagues out of the fear that doing so would taint the 
purity of the associated athletes, teams, and leagues.156  Expanded legalization 
of sports betting will certainly generate massive amounts of revenue, and 
plenty of potential of stakeholders will continue to squabble over fair divisions 
of fees.  Significant negotiation, litigation, and regulation lie ahead in the near 
future. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s ruling in Murphy ended a six-year legal battle between New 
Jersey and the federal government to legalize sports gambling at the state level.  
The aftermath of Murphy is just beginning and will persist long into the future, 
as major legal and economic issues will continue to be debated.  From a legal 
perspective, Murphy was only the third time the Supreme Court has struck 
down a federal law using the anti-commandeering doctrine.  Yet, in doing so, 
the majority opinion stoked the fire for the movement to revise the severability 
process and curtail the lawmaking power of the judicial branch.  From an eco-
nomic standpoint, Murphy is a watershed moment.  The sports gambling indus-
try has enormous potential, and, prior to Murphy, it was strictly concentrated 
in Nevada.  In opening the door for wider legalization of sports gambling, Mur-
phy provides Americans with broader access to sports gambling and bountiful 
new revenue streams for states.  The pie is plenty large, but the process of div-
vying up the pieces to hungry stakeholders is only just beginning. 
  
  
 154. See John Wolohan, The Potential Impact of the Murphy v. NCAA Decision on 




 155. See Ryan Hutchins, New Jersey’s Top Lawmaker Calls on States to Reject 
Sports Betting ‘Integrity Fees,’ POLITICO (May 23, 2018, 6:51 PM), https://www.polit-
ico.com/states/new-jersey/story/2018/05/23/new-jerseys-top-lawmaker-calls-on-
states-to-reject-sports-betting-integrity-fees-435282 [perma.cc/BNV4-EFXZ]. 
 156. Id.  
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